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Montana voters will find three proposed amend-
ments to their state constitution on the November 5 
ballot. If ratified, these amendments will: 
1. Increase to six (from the present three) the 
number of amendments which might appear on 
the ballot in future elections. 
2. Extend to 80 days (from the present 60) the limit 
on the regular biennial session of the Legislative 
Assembly. 
3. Allow incumbent public officers to benefit from 
legislative increases in salary for public officials. 
The bare language of these amendments leaves 
much to the imagination of the voter. This Report 
seeks to identify some of the considerations raised by 
the proposals and to relate them to other develop-
ments of some interest in the Montana political sys-
tem. 
I hope that a majority of voters will approve each 
of the three proposed constitutional amendments. 
Certainly as a group, they promise more for the 
achievement of useful, modern state and local gov-
ernment than any submitted to the voters of Mon-
tana in recent decades. 
The Six-Amendment Amendment 
The "Six-Amendment" amendment should be rati-
fied for either of two reasons: 
1. The Constitution of 1889 is demonstrably too dif-
ficult to amend, and its three-amendment restriction 
is the principal reason for this difficulty. 
2. This amendment would facilitate a conservative, 
step-by-step modernization of the Montana Constitu-
tion that would be more in tune with the state's 
needs and political practicalities than a general over-
haul of the charter by a constitutional convention. 
Difficulty of the Present Amending Process 
Two-thirds of the 1967 Legislative Assembly agreed 
that the Montana Constitution is too difficult to 
amend, and that the three-amendment limitation is a 
major part of this difficulty. 
The Montana requirements that two-thirds of each 
house support proposal of amendments, and that a 
majority of those voting on ratification must approve 
it, are common among state constitutions. But Article 
XIX, Section 9 of the Montana Constitution also re-
quires that "not more than three amendments to 
this constitution be submitted at the same election." 
The proposed amendment on the ballot November 5 
would increase this maximum number to six possible 
proposals. 
Only five state constitutions dating from the 19th 
century have been amended fewer times than the 
Montana charter. 
A comparison of many hundreds of amendment 
proposals introduced in the Montana Legislative As-
sembly with the 51 which reached the ballot before 
1968 suggests several things about what happens 
when the legislature considers these proposals: 
1. Amendment proposals introduced in each house 
are weeded out in the chamber of origin with little 
regard for what may be happening in the other 
chamber; each chamber then tends to reject the 
proposals which come from the other, and some kind 
of formal or informal summit conference resolves 
the conflicts late in the session. 
2. On the average, less than two proposals finally 
reach the ballot. Only four times-1920, 1924, 1950 
and 1968-have three amendment proposals reached 
the November popular ballot. 
3. An important qualitative selection also seems to 
happen to amendment proposals on their way to the 
voter forum. Proposals which would do something 
important get waylaid at some stage of the intricate 
legislative process. Proposals survive that have two 
of the following three attributes: a) superficial at-
tractiveness, whatever the merits; b) lack of obvious 
threat to any significant interest, or trivial import-
ance for most voters; c) support of some effective 
economic or political interest which will mobilize 
votes for proposal and ratification without arousing 
opposition. 
There seems to be nothing exceptional about re-
action of Montana voters to proposed amendments; 
they have approved 72 percent of those which 
reached the ballot. This compares with a national 
average of 74 percent ratifications among 1600 
amendments proposed in all states during a recent 
decade. 
Prospects for Constitutional Reform 
Pressures of national and local governments for 
new address to urban and community problems, 
along with the abrupt, phenomenal success of the re-
apportionment revolution in the mid-1960s, have 
quite generally quickened interest and activity to 
revitalize state government. In Montana as else-
where, citizen groups have expressed the need to 
modernize legislative and judicial systems. The three 
amendments on the 1968 ballot have unusual poten-
tial for such modernization. And the 1967 Legislative 
Assembly also directed its Legislative Council to ex-
plore whether the state constitution needs a general 
overhaul. A Council subcommittee found scarcely 
half of the 1889 Constitution to be "adequate" for 
modern conditions, and the Council will propose to 
the 1969 Assembly that a constitutional commission 
make detailed studies and recommendations to revise 
the aging state charter. 
The advantage of a general constitutional revision 
is the likelihood that changes proposed in a single 
package will provide a compatible working system 
of government. But the disadvantage of general con-
stitutional revision, as recently attempted in such 
states as New York, Maryland and Rhode Island, is 
that the big single package draws the fire of all the 
groups . which .might be adversely affected by any 
small provision; the sum of the particular segments 
of opposition then outweighs popular support for 
ratification. So the legislatures in these states are 
trying to sort out the most valuable fragments for 
re-submission as particular amendments. 
Any constitutional document "vests" interests 
either by specific provision or by common under-
standing and interpretation. Examples in Montana 
are, of course, the ancient and classic limitation on 
taxation of mining property, and the modern dedica-
tion of vehicle license and use revenues to highways. 
But much modernization of state and local gov-
ernment could be accomplished to allow effective 
responses of political agencies to a host of problems, 
without touching provisions such as those respecting 
taxation of mining property or allocation of highway 
use revenues. Especially if some body such as a con-
stitutional commission could select and present care-
fully-planned series or groups of individual amend-
ments, some modernizations could be achieved even 
if others failed to gain popular support. Much could 
be accomplished without raising frontal opposition 
of interests whose sense of self-protection leads them 
to resist any change anywher~ in the political system. 
Even under present arrangements the Montana 
Legislative Assembly could submit rather sweeping 
revisions of segments of the government, or of 
governmental functions, as single amendments or as 
a limited series of related amendments. 
More effective and well-conceived revisions could 
be accomplished by this essentially conservative ap-
proach under the six-amendment provision than 
under the present three-amendment limitation. 
Coupled with prospects that the 1969 Legislative As-
sembly may create a commission to develop this ap-
proach, the six-amendment proposal holds unusual 
interest as a conservative, step-by-step avenue to con-
stitutional modernization. 
The 80-Day Session Amendment 
The amendment to increase the length of biennial 
legislative sessions from 60 days to 80 days should be 
ratified for at least three reasons: 
1. Legislators need more time for effective internal 
handling of the modern legislative workload. 
The present constitutional time limit induces 
unreasonable haste and unnecessary confusion. 
2. To be representative, the legislative process 
must afford time and opportunity for effective 
communication between citizen-constituent and 
legislator. The 60-day session frustrates this 
kind of communication and makes everyone 
unduly dependent on the intermediate role of 
the professional lobbyist who can live with the 
legislature through the session. 
3. It may no longer be possible to "stop the clock" 
to extend the final day of the session. There is 
real possibility of deadlock between legislature 
and governor over calling a special session to 
complete legislative work, and extension of the 
session by 20 days would somewhat reduce the 
dangers of such deadlock. 
The second of these reasons seems most funda-
mental but it can be understood best after examining 
the effects of the 60-day time limit on internal legis-
lative processes. 
Effects of the 60-Day Limit on Legislative Processes 
For a particular legislative measure, the 60-day 
session is a myth. Most bills are introduced between 
the 15th and 20th day; they go to a committee which 
is supposed to complete its consideration of the bill 
within seven days. If the bill survives in the first 
chamber it is supposed to reach the second house by 
the 42nd day. Since most bills die in the chamber 
where they were first introduced, the heart of the 
legislative action is best represented by what hap-
pens there in the month between the 17th and the 
42nd day. There pressures build beyond description 
as a reasonable representative process. 
Granted, most bills should not survive process in 
the first chamber. But the suggestion here is that 
under existing pressures of time and facilities, pro-
fessional lobbyists representing too narrow a range 
of interests wield inordinate influence over decisions 
about which bills should survive and which should 
die. It must be recognized that professional lobbyists 
are absolutely essential to the legislative process; 
those who are present in Helena are there by right; 
and generally they represent their interests in a 
forthright and legitimate manner. 
The heart of the problem is that the structure and 
fabric of the legislative process working during mid-
session should be opened up, should be given more 
time so that other interests than those now so well 
represented can get into the act too. Politics de-
fensive of established interests is really fairly easy 
under the present system, while the promotion of 
imaginative new responses to large, pervasive and 
complex problems requires more time and commun-
ication between constituent and legislator than pre-
sent circumstances afford. It is inordinately easy to 
defend old institutions and interests and inordinately 
difficult to gain a hearing for new ideas and interests. 
An examination of the Assembly's committee pro-
cesses in mid-session will indicate why this is so. 
The rule requiring a committee to report a bill 
within seven days is a direct and ridiculous product 
of time pressure. But for the time limit on the ses-
sion, a sensible rule would require at least seven days 
notice before committee consideration of a bill. Some 
state legislatures have some such rule. 
In Montana committee consideration of a bill is 
frequently scheduled on less than 24 hours notice; 
and information about the bill number, its contents, 
the time and place of a committee meeting on it, and 
whether that meeting will be public or closed, is so 
scattered and haphazard that know ledge of these 
essential details becomes the stock-in-trade of lobby-
ists. Occasionally "public hearings" will be sched-
uled well in advance with ample notice to interested 
parties; experienced observers recognize these hear-
ings as ritual performances which have little rele-
vance to the usual committee processes. 
In practice the seven-day rule is waived or ex-
tended when legislators or lobbyists interested in 
the bill establish the need for more time to let in-
terests be heard. But what about affected interests 
which do not even know that the bill exists, or that 
it is in committee about to be heard, or what it 
contains because the text of the bill has not been 
available-without the mediation of a professional 
lobbyist? 
As pressures build toward midsession, legislators 
abandon their weekend trips home, to work seven 
days a week. This also is a direct product of the time 
limit on the session. It robs both legislator and con-
stituent back home of the opportunity to communi-
cate about what is going on and to exchange views 
about what should be done. Conscientious legislators 
commonly complain that they do not hear from their 
constituents when it might do some good, but that 
they get loud protests weeks or months later about 
their mistakes. How else could it be when: (1) the 
legislator, however conscientious and wise, could not 
possibly know, or have time to communicate about, 
concerns of any but the most visible and importunate 
constituents; and (2) the constituent has no reason-
able opportunity to learn what is pending unless he 
is represented virtually full-time by a hired lobbyist 
to "bird-dog" the bills which might affect him? 
Nor can the burden of such communication be 
dropped on the doorstep of the news media. The 
daily press in Montana, as elsewhere, almost exhausts 
its possibility of service by printing titles of bills in-
troduced, and by reporting what happened-after it 
happened-to a rather select number of "important" 
or spectacular measures. Systematic reporting of 
committee processes is beyond the reach of even 
great metropolitan newspapers. Radio and television 
media are even more limited and retrospective in 
their span of attention. The production schedule and 
space limitations of weekly county newspapers makes 
the "bird-dogging" of legislative proposals quite out 
of question for them-at least within the Montana 
legislative timetable. 
Pressures are so great during midsession that a 
legislator not infrequently misses notices of hearings 
on bills he has sponsored, or finds that he should be 
before two committees in different places at the same 
time. 
Meanwhile, amidst these pressures, the profes-
sional lobbyist with a limited number of bills which 
concern him, and mastery of the simple but scattered 
keys to the confusion, cultivates the members of the 
committees which will consider "his" bills, keeps 
track of time and place of meetings and hearings, and 
carefully mobilizes his forces for maximum impact 
at critical junctures in the process. 
In deliberations of the Montana Citizens Commit-
tee on the State Legislature the only open opposition 
to longer or more frequent sessions was expressed by 
several professional lobbyists who customarily live 
with the Assembly in Helena during its frenzied 
biennial short sessions. 
In recent years the Montana legislature has simpli-
fied its rules and procedures, streamlined its com-
mittee structure, shortened the time for introduction 
of bills, amplified interim research on important 
problems, and remodeled its facilities in efforts to 
achieve more efficient operation within existing 
space and time limits. Proposal of the 80-day amend-
ment is a clear message from the legislators that they 
have done most of what they can do to modernize 
their operations within existing constitutional limits 
on time and architectural limits on space and facili-
ties. They are asking for more time because in their 
judgment the public interest requires it. 
More Time for the Citizen and His Problems 
The 1967 Assembly handled about the same volume 
of business-1,000 proposals and 400 enactments-as 
the first three sessions of this century-the 1901, 1903 
(with two special sessions) and 1905 Assemblies. 
Whatever the justification for a constitutional 60-
day limit in 1889, its gross effect today is to heighten 
the legislative advantage of organized special inter-
ests whose politics are a daily preoccupation. Mean-
while broadly significant legislation in areas such as 
health, environmental control, education and com-
munity development suffer precisely because their 
base of popular support, although broad, lacks organ-
ized representation at the right time and in the right 
places. The action is over in the short legislative ses-
sion before spokesmen for these broad interests can 
identify each other and get organized. This must al-
ways be the case in some measure, but a 60-day 
measure is destructive of public interest and effective 
representation under modern circumstances. 
How might 20 more days open up the legislative 
process at critical points? Without trying to rewrite 
the rules for the legislature, suppose that the 20-day 
deadline is retained for introduction of bills, but that 
the 60th day becomes the deadline for transmittal of 
bills to the second chamber. Nearly two weeks would 
be gained during the mid-session struggle with the 
great bulk of bills, while an additional week would 
be provided for second-house consideration of bills 
and for end-of-session business. 
The seven-day rule for committee discharge of bills 
might be relaxed. A new rule might require that 
mimeographed or offset copies of a bill, and public 
notice of a committee hearing, must be available five 
to seven days prior to committee consideration of the 
bill. This would improve opportunity for communi-
cation in trade papers, organization newsletters and 
other modes of advertisement. Constituents could 
meet and plan telephone or mail communications to 
interested persons and groups. Citizens could ar-
range work schedules or personal affairs for a visit 
to Helena. News and radio editors would have time 
to write editorials and publish them. Lobbyists could 
be recruited, briefed and sent to Helena in time to 
be useful. Legislators might even get another week-
end or so at home to talk with constituents during 
the critical mid-session. 
Citizen groups have recognized the need for more 
legislative time. In 1966 about 70 prominent com-
munity and legislative leaders in the Montana-Idaho 
Assembly on State Legislatures proposed that all 
constitutional limits on length and frequency of ses-
sions should be removed. Their report said: "Legis-
lators find it difficult to learn what constituents de-
sire on major issues since relatively few constituents 
contact their legislator and these contacts often re-
late to legislative issues of narrow concern. It is diffi-
cult for constituents who are not part of a special in-
terest group to evaluate the work of their legislators 
because of lack of informRtion." 
Another group, the Montana Citizens Committee 
on the State Legislature recommends an annual ses-
sion without time limit, combined with an annual 
salary, while supporting the 80-day amendment as a 
"step in the right direction." Its poll of legislators 
after the 1967 session evoked many statements of 
urgent need for more time to schedule committee 
meetings and to conduct public hearings. Recog-
nizing that 20 more days would not solve all prob-
lems, many legislators believed that more time 
would allow more representative legislation. 
Montana's legislative problems are more common 
than unique. In recent years ten state legislatures 
have moved from biennial sessions to annual sessions 
while several others have extended or removed tim~ 
limits on their sessions. My own opportunity per-
sonally to observe not only the Montana Legislative 
Assembly but those of Ohio, Wisconsin and Massa-
chusetts which operate without time limits, per-
suades me that more is to be gained in the Treasure 
State now by extending the length of biennial ses-
sion than by annual meetings, particularly if the an-
nual session would be limited to 60 days. Short 
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annual sessions would not solve the problems of 
representative process discussed in this Report. 
The Salary-Limit Amendment 
Ratification of this amendment would allow the 
Legislative Assembly, in its discretion, to raise the 
salary of a public officer during his elected or ap-
pointive term of service. This would extend to other 
officers the benefits of a 1964 amendment which per-
mitted increase of judicial salaries during the elected 
term of service. 
The central issue is whether public service can be 
kept even moderately attractive to energetic and 
professionally competent people. The present con-
stitutional limitation operating in an inflationary 
economy requires a public officer to accept a salary 
cut for each year of continued service. Meanwhile 
most persons in private employment anticipate fairly 
frequent upward adjustments of their wage or salary 
to meet rising prices. 
It can be argued, of course, that the person accept-
ing public office recognizes this handicap. But such 
a handicap scarcely increases the appeal of public 
service for young professionally trained people. 
The problem is particularly acute where long and 
overlapping terms are involved, as among county 
commissioners who are elected at two-year intervals 
for six-year terms. If the legislature now raises the 
salary for commissioners, only the commissioners 
next elected can receive the increase. A commis-
sioner elected in 1968 would have to wait until a new 
term starting in 1974 to benefit from a salary increase 
authorized by the legislature in 1969. 
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